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The Evolution of Sovereignty and Citizenship in
Western Europe: Implications
for Migration and Globalization
JOHN

D. SNETHEN"

INTRODUCTION

The relevance of international migration' to globalization2 derives from
at least three sources: the global ramifications of what many authors deem a
migration crisis,3 the permeability of national boundaries to market growth
and expansion, and the permeability of national boundaries to the migrant
populations that follow economic opportunities across borders. The study of
international migration also poses an analytical challenge to current models
of international politics and globalization, which tend to place changing
migration strategies4 against the backdrop of the nation-state.' Scholars of
* J.D., Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington, 2000. I wish to thank Dean Alfred C.
Aman, Jr., Professor Jost Delbrock, Professor David P. Fidler, and Professor Nathat Nasr for their helpful
comments and suggestions. I am also grateful for the help of my wife, Lena Nasr Snethen, who patiently
edited several drafts of this article. Ialso wish to thank the IJGLS Board of Editors and Associates for the
many hours they worked on the text and footnotes of this Article.
I. Idefine "migration" broadly to include economically-motivated movement by non-nationals across
national borders.
2. "[G]lobalization is most often understood to mean the growth and interconnection in trade and
financial markets across-and often irrespective of-national boundaries... " Adelle Blackett, Note,
Globalization and Its Ambiguities: Implications for Law School Curricular Reform, 37 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 57, 60 (1998). Jeffrey A. Hart defines globalization according to the following five
elements: a global infrastructure, global harmonization of an important characteristic, the termination of
borders, the spread globally of a local phenomenon, and the global dispersion of expertise. See Jeffrey A.
Hart, Comments on "Changing Sovereignty Games and International Migration." 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 171,171 (1994).
3. See MYRON WEINER, THE GLOBAL MIGRATION CRISIS: CHALLENGE TO STATES AND TO HUMAN
RIGHTS 186 (1995); Guy de Lusignan, Global Migration and EuropeanIntegration, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 179 (1994). See also Mark J. Miller, Evolution ofPolicy Modesfor RegulatingInternational
Labour Migration, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION SYSTEMS: A GLOBAL APPROACH 300,302 (Mary M.
Kritz et al. eds., 1992) (arguing that international migration should be studied "because the issue has long
played a significant role in bilateral and multilateral relations among states.").
4. By "strategies" I mean any law oi oublic policy aimed at influencing migration.
5. See, e.g., David Held, Democracy,the Nation-Stateandthe GlobalSystem, in POLITICAL THEORY
TODAY 197, 210 (David Held ed., 1991) ("[W]hile there has been rapid expansion of intergovernmental
and transnational links ... the age of the nation-state is by no means exhausted."); Alfred C. Aman Jr.,
Introduction. Migration and Globalization, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1994) (noting the need
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globalization claim that labor markets that are increasingly liberated from
domestic and international regulations challenge the sovereignty of nationstates. Critics of such scholarship, on the other hand, refer to globalization as
"globaloney"6 and claim that the nation-state remains the preeminent unit of
analysis of global events. In particular, international relations scholars
frequently place great emphasis on the nation-state, which limits their ability
to explain certain 'types of change. For example, a realist "security and
stability" analysis of migration accounts for the potential destabilizing effect
of open borders on a nation-state, 7 but such an analysis emphasizes State
decisionmaking while downplaying the decisionmaking of non-State actors.
Additionally, realists link change to vaguely-defined notions of military and
economic "power" even though these so-called "powers" frequently fail to
prevent migration and in many cases even cause unwanted migrations.'
Moreover, realists (and liberals) regard the causes of change as exogenous to
their models, which gives their models descriptive value but little explanatory
value-unless "power" is accepted as both the first cause and final
explanation of all global events.9
Nevertheless, the nation-state remains an essential analytical concept in
the models of those who take globalization seriously. For example, the
"hyperglobalist" thesis focuses on the eclipsing of the nation-state by an
emerging global market, the "skeptical" thesis regards globalization as
increased economic interdependence that occurs under the guidance of nationstates, and the "transformationalist" thesis claims that nation-states remain the
for a "a research agenda on migration, globalization, and the nation-state," and that globalization "leads
authors to consider new theories of the State"); Alfred C. Aman Jr., The Globalizing State: A FutureOriented Perspective on the Public/Private Distinction, Federalism, and Democracy, 31 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 769,791-816 (1998) (analyzing globalization in terms of the role the state can and should
play); Jost DelbrOck, Global Migration-lmmigration-Multiethnicity:Challenges to the Concept of the
Nation-State, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 45 (arguing that migration justifies reconceptualizing the

nation-state); John A. Scanlan, A Viewfrom the United States-Social, Economic, and Legal Change, the
Persistence of the State, and Immigration Policy in the Coming Century, id. at 79 (arguing for the
centrality of the nation state in migration policy). See also Miller, supra note 3, at 300-03 (arguing that
the focus on nation states marginalizes the study of international migration).
6. See Jeremy Main & Karen Nickel, How To Go Global-and Why, FORTUNE, at 70 (Aug. 28,
1989).
7. See GEORGE VERNEZ, NATIONAL SECURITY AND MIGRATION: How STRONG THE LINK? 1-2
(1996); WEINER, supra note 3, at 186.
8. Cf.WEINER supra note 3, at 131.

9. See Ann Florini, The Evolution ofInternational Norms, 40 INT'L STUD. Q. 363,363 (1996). See
also George Modelski, Evolutionary Paradigm for Global Politics, id. at 321, 327-28 (1996).
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ultimate sovereign in a world of flexible jurisdictions."0 Under each of these
models, the metric of globalization is the nation-state, and the conclusions
reached by scholars who use these models are cognizable only in terms of the
nation-state. Such conclusions, however, fail to account for or even identify
certain mechanisms of globalization that are not analytically dependent on
State-centered concepts." Accordingly, it is relevant to ask under a rubric not
pegged to the nation-state why migration strategies change and how this
change helps us understand globalization.
In this Article, I adapt the evolutionary model developed by Professor
George Modelski of the University of Washington, United States, to my
analysis of globalization and the changes to Western European migration
strategies since the era of mercantilism.' 2 In Part I, I describe Professor
Modelski's evolutionary model and use his model to show that migration
strategies have moved from little structure and sparse connectivity to complex
structure and dense connectivity. In Part II, I discuss three centuries of
3 and their
changes to the strategies of national sovereignty andjus sanguinis"
relationship to Western European migration policies. I suggest that Professor
Modelski's analytical approach possesses explanatory value because it
highlights novel relationships between and among forces of globalization that
are not otherwise cognizable if a nation-state analysis controls. I conclude
that Professor Modelski's evolutionary model offers globalization scholars a
useful framework and nomenclature for describing and analyzing change to
the strategy of sovereignty and also provides a useful basis for describing the
lack of change to the strategy ofjus sanguinis.

10. See DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMY, AND CULTURE 7-10
(1999).
11. The notion of majority rule additionally implicates the limitations of models that use the nationstate as their point of reference. "Problems arise ... not only because decisions made by nation-states, or
by quasi-regional or quasi-supranational organizations... diminish the range of decisions open to a given
'majority,' but also because decisions of a majority affect (or potentially affect) not only its own citizens."
See Held, supra note 5, at 201-02.
12. I do not analyze refugees, who constitute an important factor in understanding contemporary
migration strategies. Although the exclusion of refugees from this paper may weaken the analysis, my goal
is to determine whether the evolutionary model proposed herein has explanatory power without making the
analysis unduly complex to start with. If the model proves useful at this level of analysis, then there would
be reason to apply the model to more complex analyses.
13. Latin for "right of blood." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 868 (7th ed., 1999). "The rule that a
child's citizenship is determined by the parent's citizenship." Id.
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PROFESSOR MODELSKI'S MODEL OF EVOLUTION

Professor Modelski suggests that social systems, like biological systems,
manifest directional change;' 4 therefore, scholars of globalization should be
able to use the language of biological evolution to analyze changes to legal
systems. 5 Evolution, however, does not imply an ontological dimension to
change; it only implies that change does not occur randomly. 6 Though
selection is the mechanism associated with classic Darwinism, variation sets
the evolutionary process into motion. Certain selected traits enjoy a
comparative advantage (i.e., "selective advantage") because repeated selection
beneficially amplifies their prominence within a population.
An
evolutionary model, therefore, is well suited to the "task of rebuilding from
the directly known elements the complex and unique structures which we find
in the world, and of tracing from the relations between the elements the
changes in the wholes."'" For those who take globalization seriously, a model
of evolution gives them the language to "describe the nature and direction of
changes in a complex phenomenon even though little is known about its
constituent parts and the mechanisms connecting them."' 9
Professor Modelski defines evolution as long-term change and posits the
conditions necessary for "optimum" evolutionary fitness within a given
environment.2" In analyzing change, he does not contemplate the discrete acts
14. Id. at 324 (quoting R.C. Lewontin, The Concept of Evolution, in 5 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOC.
SCI. (1968)). See also George Modelski & Kazimierz Poznanski, Evolutionary Paradigmsin the Social
Sciences, 40 id. at 315, 316 (1996). Change to social institutions possesses a temporal direction inasmuch
as change systematically, and with a logic particular to its own inner workings, manifests itself as increasing
complexity and innovation produced by a trial-and-error process of learning. See Modelski, supra note 9,
at 323-25,329. Learning itself possesses directionality inasmuch as learning is an orderly, phased process,
which develops its own structure over time. Cf id. at 324. See generally THE EVOLUTIONARY WORLD
POLITICS HOMEPAGE, availableat http://faculty.washington.edu/modelski/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2000).
15. See Modelski, supranote 9, at 327.
16. See Modelski, supra note 9, at 324-25.
17. Id. at334-35.
18. F.A. HAYEK, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE: STUDIES ON THE ABUSE OF REASON 129
(2d ed., 1979) (1952).
19. E. Donald Elliot, The Evolutionary Traditionin Jurisprudence,85 COLUM. L. REV. 38, 90 (1985).
Professor Elliot's article provides a valuable overview of the history of evolutionaryjurisprudence from the
eighteenth century to the twentieth century. See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in
Jurisprudence, 64 TEX. L. REV. 645 (1985), and J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory
to Describe the Evolution ofLaw and Sociely andIts PracticalMeaningfor Democracy, 49 VAND. L REV.
1407 (1996).
20. See Modelski & Poznanski, supra note 13, at 316.
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of individuals; 2I rather, he studies certain strategy populations that the nationstate may or may not have created. He thereby avoids characterizing the
nation-state as the force that globalization has overcome, or as the force
against which globalization cannot prevail. As Professor Modelski notes,
"[N]ation-states are not the basic units of world politics, even though certain
nation-states may at times be carriers of global policies. 22
Changes to migration strategies can be thought of as the search for more
effective institutions at the global level, the selection of institutional
governing rules, and the institutional selection of strategies.2 3 Such
institutions are among the components of the nation-state and may include
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and loosely-organized migrant
groups. In keeping with the analogy of evolution, these institutional strategies
can be characterized as the DNA of migration,' 4 or as the "memes"2 of
migration (i.e., self-replicating instructional sets "of global potential" that lay
down the rules for behavior within the migration system)." Nevertheless, this
analysis is limited to the extent that social systems, unlike biological systems,
do not undergo unitary change.2 7
Four mechanisms cause change: variation (or innovation), cooperation,
selection in its classic Darwinian sense, and reinforcement." Variation
manifests itself as policy innovations, whereas cooperation entails the
formation of alliances that enable the selection and survival of international
and global strategies. 29 The selection of strategies at the international and
global level can occur by war, election, economic competition,"0 or by the
action of a "norm entrepreneur," which has been defined as "an individual or
organization that sets out to change the behavior of others."'
The
21. Id. at 331.
22. Id.
23. See Modelski, supra note 9, at 321, 329.
24. See MURRAY GELL-MANN, THE QUARK AND THE JAGUAR: ADVENTURES IN THE SIMPLE AND THE
COMPLEX 292 (1994) (quoting Hazel Henderson on "cultural DNA").
25. See RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 189-202 (new ed. 1989). Evolutionary biologist
Richard Dawkins coined the term "meme" to signify a self-replicating packet of information that can

include
beliefs.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

something as simple as a chain letter to more complex information packets, such as religious
Id.
See Modelski, supra note 9, at 331.
1d. at 327.
Id. at 334.
Id. at 336.
Id.
Florini, supra note 9, at 374-75.
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reinforcement of a surviving strategy occurs by rewarding selection and
punishing non-selection." Path dependence, a phenomenon where "every
successive act in the development of an. . . organisation, or an institution is
strongly influenced by. .. the path (experience and evolution) previously
covered,"3 3 also reinforces a surviving strategy. Whether a strategy survives
and reproduces depends on the sequential combined effects of the four
evolutionary mechanisms of variation, cooperation, selection, and
reinforcement.34
I. SOVEREIGNTY AND JUS SANGUNIS-UNITS OF EVOLUTIONARY
ANALYSIS

Sovereignty, with its embedded norm of the competency of the sovereign
to assert its will,35 is a fundamental strategy that affects the selection of
migration policies.36 The concept of sovereignty is also "closely related to the
nature and evolution of the state."37 The link between the evolution of
sovereignty and the migration policies of the State have been eroding.3" The
link was never strong, in part because the modem notion that a State possesses
the unfettered discretion to restrict migration has no ancient precedence.39

32. See Modelski, supra note 9, at 336. See also Anthony D'Amato, Is International Law Really
"Law "?,79 Nw. U. L. REv. 1293, 1303-14 (1985) (arguing that reinforcement of strategies occurs through
threats of"reciprocal entitlement violation"). Reinforcement also depends on the compatibility of the new
strategies with existing strategies, and the compatibility of those strategies with the environment in which
they operate. Cf Florini, supra note 9, at 377.
33. Salvator Rizzello, The Microfoundations of Path Dependency, in EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS

AND PATH DEPENDENCE 100 (Lars Magnusson & Jan Ottosson eds., 1997).
34. See Modelski, supra note 9, at 335-36.
35. See generally JOSEPH A. CAMILLERI & JIM FALK, THE END OF SOVEREIGNTY? 11(I 1992) (arguing
that sovereignty "is a concept.., about the way political power is or should be exercised.").
36. Seegenerally Alden v. Main, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 2271-73 (1999) (comparing and contrasting the
common law and natural law conceptions of sovereignty). See also Miller, supra note 3, at 302 ("IThe
significance of i'nternational migration to foreign policies is generally downplayed... for reasons which
relate to sovereignty.").
37. CAMILLERI & FALK. supra note 35, at 15.
38. WEINER, supra note 3.at 112.
39. See RICHARD PLENDER, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 2 (rev. 2d ed. 1987).
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The U.S. Supreme Court in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, however, made
the contrary-and erroneous--claim that
[i]t is an accepted maxim of international law, that every
sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty,
and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of
foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such
cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to
40
prescribe.
The Court in Ekiu apparently misunderstood the writings of Emmerich de
Vattel. Contrary to the implication that the whim of a sovereign justifies the
migration strategy of a State, Vattel believed that the sovereign must justify
the regulation of migration based on an advantage conferred to the State by the
regulation. In Vattel's words, "[tjhe Sovereign may forbid the entrance of his
territory to either foreigners in general, or in particular cases, or to certain
persons, or for certain particular purposes, according as he may think it
advantageous to the state."' Other international law scholars, such as
Pufendorf, also recognized the restrictive right of the sovereign to exclude
foreigners. The holding in Ekiu, therefore, appears to mark the birth of a
policy mutation that continues to compete for selection today.4
Throughout the twentieth century, numerous scholars and jurists have
rejected the notion of absolute state sovereignty over migration policy. The
Permanent Court of International Justice (ICJ), for example, held that although
international law did not regulate nationality, the right of State discretion was
"restricted by obligations which it may have undertaken towards other
'
states."43
Many contemporary scholars agree with the ICJ. For example,
40. 12 S.Ct. 336, 338 (1892) (emphasis added).
41. MONSIEUR DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE APPLIED
TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS § 94 169 (Joseph Chitty ed., T. & J.W.
Johnson, Law Booksellers, 7th Am. ed., 1849) (emphasis added).
42. CfPLENDER, supra note 39, at 2. For a thorough treatment of the topic of absolute versus
restricted sovereignty and the historical evolution ofboth, see James A.R. Naffiger, The GeneralAdmission
of Aliens Under International Law, 77 AM. J. INT'L L 804 (1983). Nafziger highlights a counterglobalizing force inherent in the theory of absolute sovereignty, noting that "[tlhe proposition that states
may exclude aliens impedes global cooperation." Id. at 806.
43. See Advisory Opinion No. 4, Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, 1923 P.C.IJ. (ser.
B) No. 4, at 23-24 (Feb. 7) [hereinafter Nationality Decrees]. The idea was not a novel one. See The
Schooner Exchange v. M'faddon, 11 U.S. 116, 137 (1812) ("A nation would justly be considered as
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Professor Tomas Hammar of the Centre for Research in International
Migration and Ethnic Relations, Stockholm University, Sweden, has said,
"Although there are clearly autarchic elements in international migration
policy and most states make serious attempts to control migration to their
territory, they are evidently far from being truly independent and sovereign
within the international political system."" The belief in State freedom to
unilaterally control migration "appears misplaced in the conditions of
contemporary international relations." 5 Nevertheless, the competition
between the strategy of absolute sovereignty versus the strategy of restricted
sovereignty has continued throughout the twentieth century."
A pair of other strategies-the ancient legal doctrines ofjus sanguinis and
jus soli' 7-- also affect migration because the former strategy contains the norm
of consanguinity and the latter contains the norm of birthplace.48 The norm
of consanguinity, for example, allows States to distinguish between acceptable
and unacceptable migrants, which helps to select the migrants that States will
naturalize. Therefore, migration polices and their effects on migrants and
indigenous populations cannot be analyzed without analyzing the strategies
of nationality. 9 Jus sanguinis and jus soli exert tremendous influence on
migration policies (jus sanguinismore so thanjus soli) and particularly affect
migrant children who are born in the host country of one or both parents.
A. Sovereignty-A Rational GlobalizingForce
My analysis of Western European migration strategies begins with a
discussion ofmercantilism, the economic strategy that dominated Europe from
the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries." During the era of mercantilism,
violating its faith ... which should suddenly and without previous notice, exercise its territorial powers
in a manner not consonant to the usages and received obligations of the civilized world.").
44. Tomas Hammar, Laws and PoliciesRegulating Population Movements: A European Perspective,
in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION SYSTEMS, supra note 3, at 249. Cf. GuY S. GOODWIN-GILL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS BETWEEN STATES 6 (1978).

45. PLENDER, supra note 39, at 1.
46. See id., at 1-4.
47. Latin for "right of the soil." BLACK'S LAW DICTtONARY 868 (7th ed. 1999). "The rule that a
child's citizenship is determined by place of birth." Id. See also. 'yus sanguinis," supranote 13.
48. See PLENDER, supra note 39, at 11.
49. Id. at 4.
50. See ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, Mercantilism, http://search.eb.con/bol/
topic?eu=53378&sctn=1 (last visited Nov. 6, 1999). Under mercantilism, a sovereign's wealth was related

2000]

EVOLUTION OF SOVEREIGNTY & CITIZENSHIP

States competed for labor under conditions of slow population growth;
consequently, migration strategies were designed to capture working
populations by imposing strict exit prohibitions on nationals and providing
liberal entrance policies for non-nationals."' Competition between the
strategies of monarchical sovereignty and national sovereignty distinguished
the latter mercantile and post-mercantile eras; subjects of States found their
allegiance divided between the crown and the kingdom. 2 The contest would
decide whether and to what extent a nation could claim absolute sovereignty
as a justification for the exclusion of aliens.
National sovereignty eventually demonstrated greater evolutionary fitness
than monarchy. Although scholars such as William Blackstone ascribed
sovereignty to the monarch, 3 monarchical sovereignty waned as national
sovereignty grew. Professor Richard Plender notes that the strategy of
national sovereignty gained a selective advantage in an environment that was
ripe with innovation:
The re-birth of the classics, the growth of nationalism, the
increase in international trade and the related temporary
alliance between merchants and monarchs, the Reformation
and the secularization of political theory combined to
The
strengthen the idea of a State as a unified force ....
Civil War, The Leviathan, the propagation of Locke's thesis
that the supreme power resides in the people and the
resurgement of the view that the Original Contract is the
basis of sovereignty all seem to have combined to weaken the
theory that allegiance is owed to the King in person rather
than the body politic represented in him. 4
It is significant that Professor Plender characterizes the nature of cooperation
to the number of workers he could command. See Nafziger, supra note 42, at 808.
51. See Aristide R. Zolberg, LabourMigrationandInternationalEconomicRegimes: Bretton Woods
and After, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION SYSTEMS, supra note 3, at 320.
52.. See PLENDER, supra note 39, at 14. For a brief history of modem notions of nation state, see
Delbrilck, supra note 5, at 48-53.
53. "And, first, the law ascribes to the king the attribute of sovereignty or pre-eminence..."See I
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 234 (1765).
54. See PLENDER, supra note 39, at 14-15.
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during this period as one of temporary alliances between migrant merchants
and monarchs. The evolutionary model suggests that cooperation will first
stabilize, then grow more complex over time. The impermanent merchantmonarch cooperation of this early era was the beginning of modem complex
notions of sovereignty.
By the end of the eighteenth century, the modem notion of "nationality,"
created by Article 25 of the French Constitution of 1793," would confer an
additional selective advantage to the strategy of national sovereignty.
Moreover, as the Peace of Westphalia enhanced the fitness of absolute
national sovereignty, the growth of international relations enhanced the fitness
of restricted sovereignty. Ultimately, three species of sovereignty evolved
during this era: absolute monarchical sovereignty (which was losing
evolutionary fitness), absolute national sovereignty (which was gaining
evolutionary fitness), and restricted national sovereignty. The latter variant
lay dormant until an evolutionary mechanism-international
cooperation-triggered its availability for selection. Variation of strategies,
therefore, existed during and immediately after the mercantile era, thus
satisfying the first element of the evolutionary model.
The next step under the evolutionary model requires the identification and
analysis of cooperation. Variation encourages cooperation to the extent that
an effective alliance greatly enhances the survivability of a strategy.56 Many
scholars view cooperation as a necessary component of evolution; therefore,
selection can also be characterized as cooperative rather than competitive."
Cooperation also necessarily precedes selection; without cooperation, the
international selection of strategies could not occur, and migration policies
would solely be domestic creations.
Migration policies themselves can lead to cooperation among States. 58
Within the European Community (EC), migration policies are no longer

55. Id. at 9.
56. See Modelski, supra note 9, at 336. Shared cultural and historical similarities between and among
regions and countries also tend to facilitate cooperation in the form of bilateral or multilateral agreements.
See Mary M. Kritz & Hania ZIotnik, Global Interaction: Migration Systems, Processes, and Policies, in
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION SYSTEMS, supra note 3, at 13.
57. See Modelski, supra note 9, at 334. Modelski also associates spontaneous organization with
cooperation. Id. See also Rizzello, supra note 33, at 114-16 (arguing that spontaneous organization is
a condition precedent to formalization of institutional rules).
58. See WEINER, supra note 3, at 112.
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exclusively domestic, but have merged with the policies of other States. 9
Thus, entrance and exit rules are negotiable throughout the European Union
(EU).6 ° This "supranational" form of cooperation not only increases the
complexity of migration strategies, but it also increases the likelihood that
States will cooperate with other actors to ensure the fitness and survival of
these strategies. State cooperation is not a foregone conclusion, however,
inasmuch as relations among nation-states can be analyzed "along a
continuum ranging from friendly or mutually beneficial relations to highly
conflictual."' Nevertheless, once a population of migration strategies has
changed, an analysis of the cooperation among nation-states and NGOs is the
next step in the evolutionary model, with particular attention given to what
form such cooperation takes.
The ascendance of national sovereignty over monarchy increased the
possibility that cooperation would evolve between nation-states. This
cooperation took the form of the bilateral treaty, itself a sporadically used
strategy until the nineteenth century. Bilateral treaties, therefore, "carried"
many, if not most of the selected migration strategies.62 Before the era of
mercantilism, the prevailing form of cooperation was a unilateral grant from
the monarch. 63 During the era of mercantilism, bilateral treaties were used ad
hoc, although some treaties did contain migration provisions for the mutual
admission of citizens.64 A more commonly used strategy by the mid-1600s
was for States to combine most-favored-nation status with State treatment of
foreign nationals on par with State treatment of domestic citizens. Thus began
65
the modem legal strategy of using commercial treaties to regulate migration.
By the mid-nineteenth century, the regulation of migration within bilateral
commercial treaties was the standard method to implement European
59. Id.
60.
61.

Id. at 119.
Kritz & Zlotnik, supra note 56, at 12-13.

62. See PLENDER, supranote 39, at 4. Bilateral treaties were the predominate form of treaty during
the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICES, 103D CONG., IST SESS., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE
ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 17 (Comm. Print 1993).
63. J.W.H. VERZIJL, 5 INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 429(1972).
64. Id. at 418. See also Miller, supra note 3, at 304 ("With few exceptions ... work available on

bilateral labour agreements consists of case-studies, an approach that obscures understanding of parallels
in the evolution of bilateral labour agreements on both sides of the Atlantic."). Miller provides a
bibliography of selected case studies of bilateral labor agreements.
65. See VERzIJ, supra note 63, at 432.
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migration strategies, in contrast to the earlier ad hoc and temporary uses of
bilateral treaties." Nineteenth century treaties typically contained simple
provisions that dealt with temporary labor shortages; over the decades, the
complexity of these migration provisions grew.6" Meanwhile, because of
growing bilateralism, in Europe there occurred for the first time since the
Peace of Westphalia the "nearly free movement of people in that sector of the
world which was becoming linked by the gold standard into a free-trade
system."6 8 With few exceptions, European migration strategies remained
liberal until the latter part of the nineteenth century.69
Prompted by economic crisis in the late nineteenth century, European
bilateral migration policies grew more restrictive.70 The selective exclusion
of aliens by asserting national sovereignty gained impetus from English and
U.S. courts, whose case holdings amplified antimigration principles."
Nevertheless, nation-states continued to enter bilateral commercial agreements
that regulated migration. After World War I, however, many nations
discovered that they could not adequately solve their migration problems by
multiplying their domestic migration laws. Interdependence among nationstates required more than domestic migration strategies.12 Hence, post-World
War I bilateral migration treaties started to include labor, social security, and
workers' compensation provisions.73
By the post-World War I years, bilateralism had become the established
cooperative method for implementing migration strategies. International
cooperation conferred a selective advantage to restricted sovereignty; any
claim of absolute sovereignty by a nation-state would have precluded
cooperation on migration strategies with other nation-states. Although the
choice of nation-states to cooperate appears to have been a defacto selection
of restricted sovereignty, it is significant that there had been no de jure
selection of restricted sovereignty by any nation-state during the pre-World
66. Cf. League of Nations, International Labour Office, Report on Legislation Concerning the
Movement of Labour and Migration in General, 26 (May 4, 1927) (noting the general nature of pre-World
War I migration treaties) [hereinafter League of Nations Migration Report].
67. See PLENDER, supra note 39, at 308-09.
68. Zolberg, supra note 51, at 321.
69. PLENDER, supra note 39, at 67.
70. See THOMAS SOWELL, MIGRATION AND CULTURES 45 (1996); Zolberg, supra note 51, at 322.
71. See Nafziger, supra note 42, at 835.
72. See League of Nations Migration Report, supra note 66, at 25.
73. Id. at 27.
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War II years. In evolutionary terms, it is more accurate to conclude that
cooperation did not result in the passive selection of restricted sovereignty;
rather, cooperation conferred a selective advantage to the strategy of restricted
sovereignty.
By this time in the evolutionary history of migration strategies, logically
coherent domestic and international evolutionary roles had supplanted the
domestic regulation of migration. These decentralized cooperative processes
"enforced" emerging global migration strategies, which suggests that the
normative and functional basis for global migration law is cooperation, "by
reference to which the validity of the other rules of the system is assessed, and
in virtue of which the rules constitute a single system."74 Because the survival
of a particular migration strategy enhances the likelihood that nation-states
and other actors will cooperate, the principle of cooperation acts as an
"ultimate provision" from which separate migration strategies derive their
binding force.7" In other words, the analysis of strategy enforcement under
Professor Modelski's model of evolution leads to an understanding of
enforcement, not as coercion or threats to extinguish reciprocal entitlements,76
but as the consequence of evolutionary mechanisms. In keeping with the
absence of teleology in the model of evolution, no preferred course of action
should be inferred from the principle of cooperation. The principle of
cooperation does suggest, however, that whatever course of action actors take,
it will possess a fundamental element of collaboration upon which the survival
of a migration strategy will rest and against which it will be judged.
The cooperative selection of migration strategies during the twentieth
century has manifest itself as "[t]he rapid development of customary rules
governing the opposability of nationality" and the "simultaneous development
of treaty law" under the impetus of the League of Nations.77 The twentieth
century migration controversy has been whether cooperating nation-states will
retain absolute state sovereignty over domestic migration policies.7" By the
time World War I broke out, many countries had placed legal limits on
74. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 228 (1961).
75. Cf id. at 229. See also James F. Hollifield, Migration, Trade. And The Nation-State: The Myth
of Globalization, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 595, 629 (Spring/Summer 1998) ("One of the
principal effects of economic interdependence is to compel states to cooperate.").
76. See D'Amato, supra note 32, at 1310.
77. PLENDER, supra note 39, at 45.
78. Id. at 61.
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foreigners, which provoked criticism from scholars who argued that
international law restricted State discretion to impose such limits. 9 After
World War I ended, States again tried to liberalize migration policies for
laborers,8 ° though without explicitly conceding national sovereignty to
international law.
The cooperative selection of migration strategies prior to World War II
was part of an indirect institutional regulation of migration by European
leaders."' Subsequent to World War II, however, Europe entered several
periods of overlapping crises and conflicts that forced States to adopt "explicit
migration legislation and administration." 2 As part of the response by the
international community to World War II, domestic controls over migration
were strengthened, 3 and laws that promoted the equality of all persons were
strengthened.8 4 Hence, European treaties that included migration provisions
also began to include human rights provisions.85 International human rights
foreshadowed a growing global multilateralism by linking the migration
policies of a State to the migration policies of all other States. 6 The primacy
of international human rights consequently enhanced the fitness of restricted
sovereignty as the appropriate measure of State authority by which to enforce
domestic migration policies. The deliberate selection of restricted sovereignty
over absolute national sovereignty therefore occurred when Western European
States explicitly adopted migration strategies negotiated by the international
community and non-state actors.
The next step in Professor Modelski's model of evolution requires an
analysis of how the strategy of restricted sovereignty was reinforced.
79. See id. at 3.
80. See Hammar, supra note 44, at 251. By the 1920s, European states had dispensed with visa
requirements, which was a wartime strategy that would be selected again during World War IIand again
discarded at the end of the war.
81. Id. at 245 (noting that European migration policy "has often been both a non-policy, implicit and
unarticulated, and a non-political issue").
82. Id. at 256.
83. PLENDER, supra note 39, at 80. Cf Zolberg, supra note 5 1, at 317 (finding the post-war period
uncooperative by virtue of each state pursuing its own migration policies in competition with other nation
states to attract cheap labor ).
84. See PLENDER, supra note 39, at 80.
85. Id. at 309.
86. See VERzIJL, supranote 63, at 437 (objecting to states being "allowed to take shelter behind the
legislative and administrative regime meted out to its own subjects, in order to escape accusations from
abroad for the manner in which it treats foreigners").
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Professor Modelski suggests that strategies will be reinforced when actors
learn by adjusting their behavior to the new strategies.8 7 The reinforcement
of a strategy can also occur by rewarding selection and punishing
nonselection,"8 by seeking efficiency through the harmonization of policies, 9
"[t]hrough centralization of regulatory power and the pooling of sovereignty,"
and by persuasion.9" New strategies are usually spread by the acts of
enforcement agencies, social groups, and other non-state actors within a
system of inheritance (i.e., legal codes, treaties, and legislative histories). 9
As a consequence of these various mechanisms, a particular strategy typically
grows in prominence, persists, and reproduces by transmitting a set of
instructions to the following generation of strategies.92
Subsequent to World War II, multilateralism begin to replace
bilateralism.93 Although multilateral migration treaties existed at least as early
as the late eighteenth century, these treaties prohibited or provided for
involuntary migration (i.e., the importation of slaves).94 In the early twentieth
century, States attempted to form multilateral migration treaties, but World
War I interrupted these efforts.95 Nevertheless, by the mid-twentieth century,
economic migration required more than domestic or bilateral migration
policies.96 These requirements were first satisfied, first in 1947 when
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg formed the Benelux Customs
Union,97 then in 1949 when the Council of Europe was established. For the
remainder of the twentieth century, the Council would play a prominent
entrepreneurial role in reinforcing European migration strategies.9"
87. See Modelski, supra note 9, at 335.
88. Id. at 336. See also D'Amato, supra note 32, at 1310.
89. See Hollifield, supra note 75, at 629.
90. Id.
91. Cf. Modelski, supra note 9, at 336.
92. Id.
93. "Multilateral treaties on migration are not concerned with the particular interests of the nationals
of certain States. They form a general field applying to several countries, whose migration regulations are
thus standardised, extended, and more adequately enforced." League of Nations Migration Report, supra
note 66, at 27.
94. Cf.id.
95. Id. at 28. For edited copies of post-World War 11multilateral migration instruments, see BASIC
DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 1-81 (Richard Plender ed., 2d rev. 1997).
96. Cf.PLENDER, supra note 39, at 298.
97. THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 520, (15th ed. 1998), available at
http://search.eb.com/bol/ topic?xref=15220&pm=! (last visited Sept. 16, 2000).
98. See PLENDER, supra note 39, at 227.
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Burgeoning multilateralism notwithstanding, numerous bilateral agreements
were entered into during this time as European policymakers sought to recruit
labor for the growing domestic markets of their States.99 Nevertheless,
European multilateralism continued to grow more complex. For example, in
the mid-1950s the multilateral European Economic Community (EC) was
formed. " Article 118 of the Treaty of Rome provides that EC Member States
will harmonize their social policies: °' Article 48 provides for the "freed
movement of workers,"'0 2 Article 52 provides for self-employment in a
Member State other than one's own,0 3 and Article 59 provides for services
among Member States."°4 The provisions in the Articles had once been the
strategies selected by the European States during bilateralism. Each strategy
restricted national sovereignty, and each strategy possessed the selective
advantage of residing within a written multilateral instrument. The 1950s
concluded with the establishment of the multilateral Benelux Economic
Union, a harbinger of arrangements to come within the EC. 0 5
With an established multilateral reinforcement mechanism in Europe,
migration policy remained relatively static during the economic boom years
of the 1960s. The 1973 oil crisis and subsequent economic recession,
however, prompted widespread change to European migration policies.
Primary migration halted after the recession, 1 6 and more than a century of
bilateral efforts to regulate migration in Europe ceased .' °7 Multilateral
99. See Heinz Fassman & Rainer M(nz, Patternsand Trends of InternationalMigrationin Western
Europe, 18 POPULATION & DEVELOPMENT R. 457,459, 461 (1992).
100. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. II
[hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. The Treaty of Rome used the term "free movement of persons instead of
"migration." Id. at 36. The term "European Economic Community" in the Treaty of Rome was shortened
to "European Community" by the Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, title 11,art. G, I C.M.L.R. 719,
729 (1992) [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty]. The Treaty of Rome was further amended by the Consolidated
Version of the Treaty on European Union and the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, 37 I.L.M. 56 (1998) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam].
101. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 100, at 61-62.
102. Id. at 36.
103. Id. at 37-3 8. But see ELSPETH GUILD, ED., THE DEVELOPING IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM POLICIES
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 369 (1996) ("[A]s a matter of principle third country nationals should not be
admitted under an independent economic activity category if the activity is of no economic benefit to the
state or its regions.").
104. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 100, at 40-4 1.
105. See PLENDER, supra note 39, at 273.
106. Michael Banton, NationalIntegration and Ethnic Violence in Western Europe, 25 J. ETHNIC &
MIGR. STUD. 5, 5 (1999).
107. See Miller, supra note 3, at 300-14.
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migration provisions, however, remained intact."° The global scope of the
1973 crisis created an environment in which bilateral domestic solutions to
migration problems lacked the evolutionary fitness to survive. Nevertheless,
even multilateralism appeared threatened by the recession, which had
prompted "widespread uncertainty about standards of international solidarity,
mutual aid or cooperation, and burden sharing.""
The 1985 Schengen Agreement," 0 which provided for the abolition of
national border controls among signatories,"' was the first successful
multilateral effort to resolve the post-oil crisis uncertainty. Member States
continued to create domestic migration strategies, but these strategies achieved
mixed results. "' The reinforcement of restricted sovereignty occurred in 1986
when the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for the first time interpreted a legal
text by applying a Community standard. The issue was whether a person
should be characterized as a worker under Article 48 of the Treaty of Rome
or according to the "freedom of establishment" clause in Article 52."' In
defining these criteria, the ECJ declined to interpret them according to the
norms of the Member State parties to the dispute." 4 Restricted sovereignty
had thus been reinforced at the supranational judicial level.
In June 1990, Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands signed a Convention on the practical application of the Schengen
Agreement." 5 In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty was signed."H6 This treaty

108. See, e.g., The European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers, Nov. 24, 1977,
E.T.S. 93. "The object of the Convention is to regulate the legal situation of migrant workers who are
nationals of member States, so as to ensure ...that they are treated no less favourably than workers who
are nationals of the receiving States in all aspects of living and working conditions."
109. Nafziger, supra note 42, at 805.
110. See Agreement Between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the
Federal Republic ofGermany and the French Republic on the Gradual Abolition ofControls at the Common
Frontiers, June 14, 1985, 30 I.L.M. 73 [hereinafter Schengen Agreement].
I11. See Jean-FranHois Bellis, Introductory Note to Belgium-France-Federal Republic of GermanyLuxembourg-Netherlands: Schengen Agreement on the General Abolition of Checks at their Common
Borders and the Convention Applyingthe Agreement. 30 I.LM. 68.
112. For example, employer sanctions against hiring illegal migrant workers were successful in France
and Germany during this period, but failed in Spain and Italy. See Hammar, supra note 44, at 252.
113. See PLENDER, supra note 39, at 195 (citing to Hoekstra v. Bestuur).
114. Id.
115. See Convention Applying the Schzngen Agreement of 14 June 1985 Between the Governments
ofthe States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic,
on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders, June 19, 1990, 30 IL.M.84.
116. See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 100, at 573.
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reinforced the strategy of restricted sovereignty by providing "for an
intergovernmental system for making decisions in all these cases," thereby
requiring each Member State to concur on each decision before any Member
State could take action. 7 Multilateral control over migration grew even more
complex in 1993 when freedom of movement, "which in the early years of the
'common market' was confined to workers in paid employment," was deemed
a general right within the EU." 8 The multilateral control over migration grew
more complex yet when, in 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam provided for the
removal of barriers to free movement.' '"
Although the reinforcement of restricted sovereignty has occurred in the
EU, the ECJ has held that each Member State remains free to impose limited
restrictions at its border until the EU completely unifies its migration
policies. 20 Nevertheless, more than one scholar believes that "migration
policy can no longer be decided simply on the basis of state sovereignty or the
idea that a government need only control its borders."'' In the future, market
and political pressures may render the strategy of sovereign borders an
anachronism and may even strip it completely of evolutionary fitness.'2 2 In
the meantime, the EU has chosen a strategy of harmonizing Member State

117. EUROPA, Moving Freely and Living in a Secure Environment, at
http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/intro/chap2/en l.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2000) [hereinafter
Moving Freely].

118. Id. There is today a strong presumption among Member States to favor multilateral migration
strategies. See, e.g., Recommendation Regarding Practices Followed by Member States on Expulsion, in
GUILD, supra note 108, at 222 ("Where possible, such agreements should be multilateral.").
119. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 100, at 86.
120. See EUROPA, Recent Case-Law of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance, Case

378/97,

Florus

Ariel

Wijsenbeek,

at

http://europe.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-bin/

form.pl?lang--en&Submit=Submit&docrequire=judgements&numaff=&datefs=&datefe=&nomusuel=

Wijsenbeek&domaine=LCPE&mots=&resmax=100 (last visited Dec. 18, 2000).
[Als long as Community provisions on controls at the external borders of the
Community... have not been adopted, the exercise of those rights presupposes that
the person concerned is able to establish that he or she has the nationality of a
MemberState.... Member States remain competent to impose penalties for breach
of such an obligation ....
However, Member States may not lay down apenalty so
disproportionate as to create an obstacle to the free movement of persons, such as
a term of imprisonment.
Id. (citations omitted).
121. WEINER, supra note 3, at 170.
122. Cf id., at 201. See also Zolberg, supra note 51, at 315 ("Within a capitalist world economy

founded on free-market principles, the persistence of barriers to population movement between countries
constitutes an anomaly.").
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migration policies,123 which will result in the continuing reinforcement of
restrictive sovereignty at the multilateral level.'24 The relevance of national
borders, particularly between Eastern and Western Europe, and the effects of
national borders on non-nationals continues to play an important role in the
evolution of European migration policy.'25
B. Jus Sanguinis-A Non-Rational Counter-GlobalizingForce
Unlike the strategy of sovereignty, the strategy ofjus sanguinis cannot
easily be analyzed under the rubric of innovation-cooperation-selectionreinforcement. Either the nomenclature of evolution is inadequate to account
for the relationship ofjus sanguinis to the evolution of migration strategies,
or the linear progression ofjus sanguinisrequires a longer historical view than
the one used in this Article to analyze sovereignty. Given that the strategy of
jus sanguinis is more than two millennia old, a longer view is unlikely to
afford the analytical rigor needed to explain this doctrine in terms of
evolutionary mechanisms. On the other hand, it may be possible to explain
the resistance ofjus sanguinisto change in terms of its optimum evolutionary
fitness.
States whose political and legal strategies have evolved from the Magna
Carta, the Bill of Rights, and the tradition of parliamentary institutions share
similar definitions of citizenship. State admission and naturalization strategies,
however, demonstrate less coherence, regardless whether a State has inherited

123. See generally Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Global Economy: Four Approaches
to Transnational Labor Regulation, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 987, 1001-6 (1995). See generally also Report
from the Ministers Responsible for Immigration to the European Council Meeting in Maastricht on
Immigration and Asylum Policy, in GUILD, supra note 108, at 449-91.
The pressure of immigration on most Member States has increased significantly in
recent years. The conviction that, confronted with these developments, a strictly
national policy could not provide an adequate response has been consistently gaining
ground . . . . [T]he aim is to make the problems manageable for the entire
Community. This will require instruments which are based on an extended form of
co-operation among Member States.
Id. at 458.
124. Cf WEINER, supra note 3, at 47. "Full harmonization of admission policy linked to employment
presupposes that this policy will cease to be defined exclusively at national level, as it will no longer be
possible unilaterally to extend or tighten the national labour market when conditions for admission are
determined at European level." GUILD, supra note 108, at 469-70.
125. See Hammar, supra note 44, at 246.

242

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES

[Vol. 8:223

a liberal tradition."2 6 While the European strategy of sovereignty during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries moved from innovation to cooperation, the
strategy of citizenship in Europe appeared to be heading in the other
evolutionary direction. Germany, for example, began to imbue its formerly
broad definition of "citizenship" with linguistic and cultural selfconsciousness.' 27 At the same time, England discardedjus soli in favor ofjus
sanguinis,though the latter strategy competed with the former'28 until 1981,
when England altogether abandonedjus soli. 29
France also has switched betweenjus sanguinis andjus soli throughout
much of its modem history. Only sixteen years after the French gave the
world the first modem definition of nationality, the 1807 Code of Napoleon
changed the rules of citizenship fromjus soli tojus sanguinis.' In 1851,jus
soli was re-introduced for third-generation immigrants, followed in 1889 by
the extension of it to second-generation immigrants. '' Meanwhile, Germany
had progressively elevated dos Volk to a mystical status that reached its
epiphany in the Nationality Law of 1913, which permitted only blood
descendants of Germans to receive German citizenship.'32 Although nationstates throughout history have repeatedly swapped the strategy of jus
sanguinis for the strategy ofjus soli, the basic assumptions underlyingjus
sanguinis never evolved in the same manner as the assumptions underlying
sovereignty.
During the latter half of the twentieth century, various naturalization
strategies from the most restrictive to the least restrictive were based onjus
sanguinis and jus soli. '
For example, EC Member States adopted the
126. See WEINER, supra note 3, at 92.
127. Id. at 97.
128. See PLENDER, supra note 39, at 16.
129. Polly J. Price, NaturalLaw and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin's Case (1608), 9 YALE J.L. &
HuMAN. 73, 77 n.15 (1997).
130. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649,667 (1898).
131. Richard Klein, Immigration Laws as Instruments of Discrimination: Legislation Designed to
Limit Chinese Immigration Into the United Kingdom, 7 TOURO INT'L L. REV. 1, 7 (1997).
132. See WEINER,.supra note 3, at 97.
133.
The most restrictive is not to admit migrants at all and to base citizenship on
descent. Less restrictive options include admitting migrants to fill temporary labor
needs, limiting their stay, and providing only minimal welfare benefits essential to
their economic performance; pemitting migrants to stay indefinitely and granting
them many (if not all) of the entitlements provided to citizens but excluding them
(and their children) from citizenship; and finally, enabling migrants to become
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strategy of "guest worker" in the 1960s as a way to import labor without
having to absorb it into society.'34 In the 1970s, the same States denied guest
workers the opportunity to become permanent residents. 3 ' At the same time,
migrant family reunification policies prevailed, though the survival of these
policies had more to do with pressure from international human rights laws
than with citizenship. 3 ' Nonetheless, host country policymakers assumed that
foreign workers would eventually return to their home countries and granted
a concession to family reunification laws. 3 7 Although strategies justified
either byjus sanguinis orjus soli could lead to a denial of citizenship,'38 jus
solijustified the regulations that shortened worker stays as a way to avoid the
birth of the children of migrants on the soil of the host country. Even after the
international denouncement of Nazi racial policies, 9 jus sanguinis has not
undergone evolutionary change that can be analyzed in terms of innovationcooperation-selection-reinforcement. All EC Member States except France
and Portugal have adopted the strategy ofjus sanguiniswithout changing the
fundamental concept of jus sanguinis.40 In other words, a notion of

naturalized citizens or granting birthright citizenship to the locally born children of
immigrants.
WEINER, supra note 3, at 93. Hammar divides the population of migration strategies into four groups:
external controls (embassy pressure abroad, and border authorities), internal controls internal state
migration bureaucracy, which implements migration policy), the passage from temporary to permanent
residence, and naturalization. See Hammar, supra note 44, at 252-53. Selection of the third and fourth
strategies promotes integration; when the strategy is to encourage temporary residence, integration is
discouraged. Id. at 255.
134. See WEINER, supra note 3, at 77.
135. See Gary Yerkey, W. Europe Immigrants Live in No Man's Land, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Tues. Mar. 30, 1982, at 8; Hammar, supra note 44, at 252.
136. See PLENDER, supra note 39, at 309.
137. See WEINER, supra note 3, at 82.
138. The distinction between jus soli and jus sanguinis has grown less relevant over the years as
Western nations (with the exception of the United States) de-emphasize settlement of migrants and
promulgate policies that make it difficult for aliens to naturalize. "Nowhere is this trend more evident than
in the European community where member countries are seeking to eliminate restrictions of movement of
people within the Community at the same time as they are standardizing and toughening their entry
requirements for migrants from third countries." VERNEZ, supra note 7, at 5.
139. See SOWELL, supra note 70, at 46.
140. Jost Delbrflck, supra note 5 at 51 (noting that France adoptedjus soli alongsidejus sanguinis);
Klein, supra note 138, at 6-7 n.13 (noting the policy of Portugal is jus sol). Of 176 countries recently
surveyed, almost three-fourths naturalize aliens based onjussanguinis rather thanjus soli. Charles Wood,
Losing Control Of America's Future-The Census, Birthright Citizenship, and Illegal Aliens, 22 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POLY 465,496 n. 87 (1999) (citing an unpublished 1994 U.S. Office of Personnel Management

report).
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"'restricted"jussanguinis14"does not exist to offset the absolutist concept of
blood ties to the State. Moreover, the strategy of European citizenship
appears to be a vehicle for non-rational norms that place a value on
consanguinity, race, and ethnicity. It is no surprise then, that implicit in the
formation of the migration policies of most European nation-states are the
42
policies of cultural homogeneity and ethnic dominance.
Viewed through the evolutionary lens, the DNA, or "meie,"' 43 ofjus
sanguinis contains the instructions for xenophobia." Likewise, viewed
through the same evolutionary lens, the meme ofjus soli contains instructions
for migrant assimilation. It is not surprising that in countries such as France
wherejus soli has been selected, the public policy toward migrants is one of
assimilation. On the other hand, in countries such as Germany that have
selectedjus sanguinis the public policy toward migrants is one that resists
assimilation. 45 The economic crisis of the 1970s,'4 during which time even
-France discarded jus soli and selected jus sanguinis, demonstrated that jus
sanguinisencodes xenophobia. 47 Ini
some countries, politicians proposed the
mass deportation of foreigners. 48 Switzerland went beyond proposals and
ushered 200,000 migrants out of the country.'49 The Swiss antiforeigner
movement was helped by growing concerns about overforeignization, 5 ° or
Uberfremdung.'5 '
Consequently, the Swiss elected antiforeigner
representatives to Parliament, where the antimigration forces nearly passed a
measure to deport all foreign workers. 5 2 The general trend throughout Europe
during this time was to exclude migrants, which discouraged economic
141. For example, the metaphor of blood in the U.S. flag does not represent a citizen's blood ties to
the United States, but the willingness of a citizen to shed his or her blood in service to the ideals of the
United Sates. This dormant U.S. species of restrictedjus sanguinis, if adopted globally, would favor the
naturalization of migrants who have made or are willing to make sacrifices of "blood, sweat, and tears" to
their host countries, and it would downplaying the importance of breeding to gain citizenship.
142. See WEINER, supra note 3, at 29-30; Hammar, supra note 44, at 256.
143. See DAWKINS, supra note 25, at 189-202.
144. Cf.WEINER, supra note 3, at 140.
145. Seeid. at47.
146. See id. at 5.
147. See PLENDER, supra note 39, at 35.
148. Hamar, supra note 44, at 257.
149. Yerkey, supra note 135, at 8.
150. Europe Turns Its Back on Migrant Workers, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Oct. 29, 1979, at
74.
151. Banton, supra note 106, at 15.
152. Fassman & M lnz, supra note 99, at 461.
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migration." 3 The trend has not abated; xenophobia remains a serious
problem in Europe. 5 4 In France, for example, LePen's National Front made
the issue of naturalization central to the political debate' and managed to
There have also been outbreaks of
weaken the principle of jus soli.
xenophobia in the Scandinavian countries.5 7 No anti-immigration party has
assumed power in Europe, however, the antiforeigner parties play a significant
role in national politics. Jorg Haiger's Austrian Freedom Party took second
place in recent Parliamentary elections, and most European leaders have been
troubled by Haiger's praise for certain economic policies of the Third
Reich. 5 8
The resistance ofjus sanguinis to change cannot easily be explained by
the linear four-part evolutionary mechanism. Nevertheless, European
citizenship can be analyzed meaningfully in terms of its optimum evolutionary
fitness. Professor Dawkins' theory of memes does not provide an answer to
the question of why some memes possess more evolutionary fitness, or have
a greater "stability and penetrance in the cultural environment" than others. 9
Professor Dawkins, however, offers a clue when he states that "[n]othing is
more lethal for certain kinds of meme than a tendency to look for evidence."'"
In other words, rational inquiry can mutate memes that are predicated on the
rules of reason-such as the national sovereignty meme that evolved out of
the Peace of Westphalia. By predicating its instructions on the rules of
reason, a rational meme contains a set of instructions for its own restriction.
The absolute national sovereignty of Western European States was a rational
153. PLENDER, supra note 39, at 311.
154. See Nafziger, supra note 42, at 833. See also Fassman & Munz, supra note 99, at 476; Banton,
supra note 106, at 9-i1; CLAUDE-VALENTIN MARIE, THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EU AND IMMIGRATION
IN 1994: LESS TOLERANCE AND TIGHTER CONTROL POLICIES 7 (1997). Not all authors agree on the scope
of xenophobia in Europe.. "The influence of the far right depends both upon the failure or refusal of
mainstream parties to cater to any sense of grievance, and upon the activity of small numbers of extremists
whose organizations tend to be short-lived since their leaders quarrel with one another." Banton, supra note
106, at 18.
155. Hammar, supra note 44, at 258.
156. Delbruck, supra note 5, at 56.
157. Hammar, supra note 44, at 258.
158. See Nazi Echoes in Austria, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1999, at B2.
159. DAWKINS, supra note 25, at 193. Dawkins suggests that a meme derives evolutionary fitness
proportional to the psychological gratification it bestows on its host. Id. This fails to account for
evolutionary fitness ofa meme beyond the level of the citizen, but does underscore the subjective dimension
to certain strategies.
160. Id. at 198.
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strategy that checked State aggression after the Thirty Years War, but it
eventually yielded to the rational demands of increasingly complex capital
flows. Events in the EU show that the terms of national sovereignty can be
negotiated.
In contrast to rational memes, non-rational memes by definition are
resistant, if not immune to reason, which makes their restriction and
negotiation difficult, if not impossible. As Sowell notes, "Not all immigration
policies have involved... rational calculations of national self-interest. Some
policies have represented simply political expediency in giving in to the public
passions of the moment."'' Isjus sanguinisa non-rational meme propagated
through "public passions?" Professor Dawkins has described non-rational
memes as possessed of a self-referencing quality so that the memes become
their own proof.'6 2 In other words, an irrational meme is accepted on faith, not
63
on reason.1
Strategies predicated onjus sanguinis reference the subjective quanta of
human experience rather than the objective phenomena of globalization, such
as the evolution of sovereignty or the growing permeability of national
boundaries. My analysis suggests that jus sanguinis possesses optimum
evolutionary fitness because it is non-rational, which allows it to survive in
otherwise hostile (rational) environments." Ifjus sanguinis does evolve, it
will start with bilateral negotiations over citizenship and naturalization
justified by shared democratic ideals and the rule of law. To some extent,
what has occurred in the EU is a movement toward this ideal. Yet, no person
ceases to be German or French when he becomes a citizen of the EU. Being
161. SOWELL, supra note 70, at 46. Sowell notes that policies of exclusion can be "emotionally
satisfying but economically self-damaging decisions." Id.
162. Richard Dawkins, Viruses ofthe Mind, in DENNETr AND HIS CIUTIcS 20 (Bo Dahlbom ed., 1993).
163. See DAWKINS, supra note 25, at 330-31. The effect of faith over reason can be profound, as

Dawkins notes: "[Faith] leads people to believe in whatever it is so strongly that in extreme cases they are
prepared to kill and die for it without the need for further justification .... Faith is powerful enough to
immunize people against all appeals to pity, to forgiveness, to decent human feelings." Id.
164. Contemporary theories of the law and economic evolution posit that a strategy possesses
evolutionary fitness proportionate to its reduction of social costs. See Elliot, supra note 17, at 62-63. On
the one hand, the foregoing suggests that by adopting a policy of xenophobia a culture that values
homogeneity could conserve the psychic tension it spends when it is confronted by heterogeneity. On the
other hand, such an analysis seems to beg the question inasmuch as xenophobia is the psychic tension
triggered by heterogeneity within a homogenous culture. The question then becomes, under the law and
economic evolution model, how does one distinguish a xenophobia meme as a means or an end? The
current evolutionary model presents no such rational choice paradox, for it assumes that a meme of
xenophobia exists to promulgate itself for itself, not to promulgate itself for the sake of efficiency or utility.
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German, French, or any of the nationalities of the EC Member States is a
necessary qualification to be a citizen of the EU.' 65 Perhaps this status quo is
better characterized as a sort of "meta-citizenship" justified by the strategy of
jus sanguinis rather than as a mutation ofjus sanguinis.
My analysis of sovereignty and citizenship reveals that the forces of
globalization fall into two categories: the rational and the non-rational. The
rational forces of globalization extend markets and increase the complexity of
economic interdependence, as can be observed in the negotiation of
sovereignty within the EU. The non-rational forces, such asjus sanguinis, can
be described as counter-globalizing because they discourage the economic
migration upon which expanding capital markets depend. 6 6 Cults of
consanguinity and racial superiority destabilize nation-states that rely on
migrant labor, which subverts global market expansion. Rational and nonrational forces at the macro level of globalization can be inferred from
observing these forces at the micro level. For example, although the jus
sanguinis meme encodes Western European xenophobia, there is a growing
belief that Europe could benefit from the assimilation strategies encoded by
jus soli. 6
Even though jus soli has not explicitly been selected by most Western
European States, countries that exhibit xenophobia have brought some migrant
workers into the national fold. For example, Switzerland during the 1970s
developed the policy of assimilating migrant workers despite Swiss
xenophobia."
By the 1980s, the xenophobia of the 1970s yielded to
assimilation policies when the guest workers who entered Europe in the 1950s
and the 1960s were finally given permanent resident status, which was
justified by the length of time the guest workers had lived in Europe. 69 In
165. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, part II, art. 8, 1 C.M.L.R. 573,
593 (1992) (conferring EU citizenship on every person holding the nationality of a Member State).
166. Cf. James N. Rosenau, The Complexities and Contradictions of Globalization, in ANNUAL
EDMONS: GLOBAL IssuEs 88-92 (15th ed., Robert M. Jackson ed. 1999). Rosenau coins the term
"fragmegration" to describe the dynamic tension between two distinct forces: globalization (the expansion
of authority and interests beyond national boundaries) and localization (the contraction of policies below
the level of national boundaries). Id. at 90. He predicts that globalization will ultimately predominate over
localization. Id. at 90-91. See also VERNEz, supra note 7, at 6 (noting the countervailing effect of
restrictive migration policies on global liberalization of international exchanges).
167. See Hammar, supra note 44, at 254, 257.
168. See Banton, supra note 106, at 15.
169. See Hammar, supra note 44, at 253.
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1984, Germany declared a policy of assimilation without naturalization 7 o of
long-resident migrant workers and their families;' 7 however, the jus
sanguinis-jussoli dichotomy remains a problem illustrated by the assimilation
policies of Germany, which attach more significance to ethnicity than do the
policies of France.' 7 2
73
Xenophobia, which partly drives migration policies in Western Europe,1
stems from economic, political, and sociological reasons, even though "[t]here
is... no economic, political, or sociological theory that specifies what would
constitute an appropriate level of immigration or what kind of immigrants
174
would be most desirable and acceptable to the local population.'
Economics probably play a less significant role in shaping migration policies
than do ethnic affinity, 17 nationalism, and the receptivity of a nation-state to
non-nationals.176 As Professor Weiner notes:
[I]t would be a mistake to think that the choices governments
make are necessarily dictated primarily by economic
considerations. Indeed, governments seeking to maximize
values other than economic growth often choose entry and
exit rules that economists would regard as inefficient. A
productive minority may be expelled by a government to
improve the status of a politically dominant ethnic group. Or
a government may restrict entry because it fears the political
170. Id.at 254.
171. See Banton, supra note 106, at 14.
172. Id.
173.
[W]hile the Member States remain committed at least in word to continue
integration policies for existing communities of long term labour migrants, the result
of labour migration primarily in the 1950s and 1960s, there is an equal commitment
•..to prevent any further communities of long term labour migrants from obtaining
security of residence and thereby become the proper object of integration policies.
Council of Interior and Justice Ministers, Resolution on Limitations on Admission of Third-Country
Nationals to the Member States for Employment, in GUILD, supra note 108, at 327. But see J.H.H. Weiler,
Thou Shalt Not Oppress a Stranger (Ex. 23 : 9): On the Judicial Protection ofthe Human Rights ofNonEC Nationals, in T.M.C. ASSER INSTITUUT, FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS IN EUROPE 251 (Henry G.
Schermers et al. eds., 1993) ("We have made little progress ifthe Us becomes European... and the Them
becomes those outside the Community." [Emphasis in original.]).
174. See WEINER, supra note 3, at 83.
175. Id. at 136.
176. Id. at 114.
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consequences of unwanted immigration, even though it
recognizes that the migrants would contribute to national
wealth.'
In terms of evolution, thejus sanguinis meme is analogous to a virus that
promulgates through complex social intercourse. Xenophobia, by virtue of
creating inhospitable environments for the selection of rational globalizing
strategies, may lead to the social quarantine of migrants. In other words,
xenophobia flourishes, not in the most homogeneous environments, which are
immune to xenophobia, but in the most heterogeneous environments. The
unanswered question is whether globalization will breed rational Europan
migration strategies or European xenophobia.'

V. CONCLUSION

In this Article, I have attempted to demonstrate that the nomenclature of
evolution can illuminate the mechanisms of globalization.' 79 Within Professor
Modelski's model of evolution, the changes to sovereignty and the absence of
changes tojus sanguinis are cognizable as the consequences of selection and
the evolutionary fitness of rational and non-rational forces. From the
perspective of evolution, then, globalization is not a transcendent international
quality or power politics in a state of anarchy. Rather, globalization is a
coherent linear process of strategic cooperative selection at the domestic and
international levels.

177. Id. at 120-21 (citation omitted).
178. There is other evidence, though not as compelling, to suggest that heterogeneity promotes
assimilation. For example, Swiss multiethnicity makes acceptance of migrants easier than it is in Germany.
See WEINER, supra note 3, at 91. Weiner also notes that countries that regard themselves as immigrant
societies are less likely to respond to immigration with xenophobia. Id. France does not consider itself an
immigration country, and has seen the rise of xenophobic parties during the 1980s and 1990s, in spite of
its strategy of inclusion. Id. at 100-01. See also GELL-MANN, supra note 24, at 303 (1994) (noting that
maladaptive strategies may survive, perhaps because the environment has changed more rapidly than the
mechanisms of change can accommodate). Cf. Weiler, supra note 173, at 250 (arguing that the very
existence of immigration policies feeds xenophobia).
179. Cf. Modelski, supra note 9, at 328.

